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NOTRE DAME LAWYER
solidation of the mortgage notes, or any of them. The relation of the
parties is not changed. No new right in the mortgaged property is given,
and no new lien is created."
By way of conclusion we think it important to emphasize two points.
The first is to determine whether either by statute or construction the
mortgage is considered to be conveyance of an interest in land. Once
this fact is determined in the affirmative, it follows that the Statute of
Frauds must'be complied with and that the mortgage agreement be in
writing. Secondly, it is necessary to observe and understand the dis-
tinction between and the provisions of the Statute of Frauds .and the
Parol Evidence Rule respectively.
Theodore P. Frericks.
RECENT DECISION
EVIDENCE - WAIVING PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.-
Among important recent decisions of the Supreme Court, Johnson v.
United States I merits attention. It redefines the constitutional privilege
of an accused in a criminal proceeding not to testify to incriminating
facts. And in view of present war hysteria and general disregard for law
and order it comes at an opportune moment.
Under the federal constitution (Amendments, art. 5), and many
state constitutions, "no person shall be . . .compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself... ." This privilege belongs to every
individual but to gain its protection it must be positively claimed by
the witness for the court will not claim the privilege for him. 2 A volun-
tary offer of testimony waives the privilege as to all relevant facts con-
cerning such direct testimony,3 and the opposing counsel may cross-
examine to reveal and explain away such relevant facts. 4 Yet if the ac-
cused refuses to testify on the grounds of this privilege and remains
silent, he has not waived it and it will protect him.5
Significantly, during the last war the decision of Caminetti v. United
States 6 was handed down which the Johnson case directly bears upon.
1 87 L. Ed..497 (1942).
2 United States v. Ginsburg, 96 F. (2d) 882 (1938) ; Johnson v. United States,
87 L. Ed. 497 (1942).
3 .Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 8 (3d Ed.) § 2276 (2); Fitzpatrick v. United
States, 178 N. S. 304, 20 S. Ct. 944, 44 L. Ed. 1078 (1900).
4 Cravens v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 261 (1933).
5 Raffel v. United States, 271 N. W. 494, 46 S. Ct. 566; 70 L. Ed. 1054 (1926).
6 242 U. S. 479, 35 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917).
RECENT DECISION
The Caminetti case holds essentially: an afcused who takes the stand
"may not stop short in his testimony by omitting and failing to explain
incriminating circumstances and events already in evidence, in which
he participated and concerning which he is fully informed, without sub-
jecting his silence to the inferences to be naturally drawn from it." And,
another principle of long standing influenced by the Johnson case is
that when the accused takes the stand without claiming his constitu-
tional privilege, it is too late for him to halt at the point which best
suits his own convenience. 7 The facts of the case prompting this declara-
tion of principle well illustrate the point. The defendant had offered
himself as a witness and testified in his own behalf. On cross-examin-
ation the state's attorney asked a question whether he had not sold
spiritous liquors within one year previous to his indictment. The witness
declined under the Bill of Rights, Art. 15, which prohibits compelling
any person to furnish evidence against himself. The state insisted that
the jury should consider the declining to answer as a pertinent matter
of evidence. Defendant's counsel objected. Overruled; and the court
directed the jury that they had a right to consider such declination as
bearing upon the question of guilt or innocence of the prisoner. "The
respondent by electing to testify in his own favor, waived his constitu-
tional privilege. If he refuses to testify at all, the statute protects him
from adverse comment or inference; but, if he avails himself of the
statute, he waives the constitutional protection in his favor, and sub-
jects himself to the peril of being examined as to any and every matter
pertinent to the issue." 8 In other words, an accused who voluntarily
testifies is subject to the same tests and rules as other witnesses, al-
though some courts refuse to phrase the rule in this manner.9
The principle enunciated in Johnson v. United States 10 can be
shown best only by a brief review of the facts. Petitioner was con-
victed of wilfully attempting to defeat and evade his federal income
taxes for the years 1936 and 1937. He was a political leader in Atlantic
City, New Jersey. The government's theory was that he had received
large amounts of money from persons conducting the numbers racket
for protection against police interference and he had not reported these
sums in his tax returns for the years indicated. The theory of the de-
fense was that the petitioner failed to list in his tax return all the in-
7 State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 459, 13 Am. Rep. 88 (1872).
8 State v. Ober, 52 N. H. 459, 13 Am. Rep. 88 (1872).
9 Clarke v. State, 78 Ala. 474, 56 Am. Rep. 45 (1885); Quintana v. State,
29 Tex. App. 401, 25 A. S. R. 730, 16 S. W. 258 (1891); Drew v. State, 124 Ind.
9, 23 N. E. 1098 (1890); Heldt v. State, 20 Neb. 492, 30 N. W. 626 (1886);
Thomas v. State, 103 Ind. 419, 2 N. E. 808 (1885); Boyle v. State, 105 Ind. 469,
5 N. E. 203 (1886); State v. Schopmeyer, 207 Ind. 538, 194 N. E. 144 (1935);
U. S. v. Buckner, 108 F. (2d) 929 (1940); Diggs v. U. S. 37 S. Ct. 192, 242 U. S.
470, 61 L. Ed. 442 (1917) ; Reagan v. U. S. 157 U. S. 301, 15 S. Ct. 610, 39 L. Ed
709 (1895).
10 87 L. Ed. 496 (1942).
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come he had received because he had the sincere but mistaken belief
that he was bound to report only the net balance remaining after de-
ducting amounts expended for political purposes. A government witness
testified that he had turned over $1200 weekly to the petitioner dur-
ing the years 1935 through November of 1937. The petitioner then
took the stand in his own defense and admitted receiving these weekly
amounts except for the two months of November and December in
1937. On cross examination he denied receiving money for these two
months. He was then asked, "Did you receive any money from numbers
in 1938?" Defense counsel objected that this question was not relevant
to the issue and would tend to prove a different offense than the one for
which the petitioner was being tried. The defense's objection was over-
ruled. Petitioner, after giving an affirmative -answer, was asked: "Who
gave it to you?" Defense counsel objected and the jury .was withdrawn
while the attorneys argued. The government asked also that the peti-
tioner be excused, from the court room. The request was acceded to
without objection. Upon returning to the court room petitioner's counsel
advised him of his constitutional privilege that if he believed the answer
to the question would incriminate him he would not have to answer the
question. The petitioner thereupon claimed the privilege. The Court
ruled, "You may decline to answer." In the course of the trial, the
prosecutor addressed the jury and made capital of the petitioner's re-
fusal to testify, drawing inferences of guilt from petitioner's refusal
to testify and continued silence. Petitioner's counsel objected to such
statements but his objection was overruled; exception was taken. The
next morning counsel for the petitioner said: "We withdraw whatever
was said last night," and he failed to have the court instruct the jury
to disregard petitioner's refusal to testify. Basis of the objection of
counsel for petitioner was that the prosecutor's reference to the claim
of privilege actually amounted to an admission of income tax violation
in 1938. This he claimed thwarted the privilege and actually incrimi-
nated the petitioner. The court approved of the grounds for the objec-
tion and added: "He is not being charged with any 1938 tax." But
then the prosecutor argued that the purpose for which the questions
were permitted was a matter of the petitioner's good faith and his
credibility, as were the answers he had already given on similar ques-
tions. The court advised: "I think I probably should indicate to the
jury that that is the full extent of it." Petitioner's counsel made no
objection thereto, nor later did the counsel assert error in the motion
for a new trial that the proscutor's comment and the court's charge
were improper.
The reasoning of the Supreme Court is significant. "The cross-exam-
ination did not run afoul of the rule which prohibits inquiry into a col-
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lateral crime unconnected with the offense charged. . . . The amount
and source of the 1938 income accordingly were relevant to show the
continuous nature of the transactions in question. ... Though the issue
might have been more aptly phrased by the court in terms other than
credibility, the meaning of the ruling in its context is plain. Thus we
may assume that it would not have been error for the court to deny
petitioner's claim of privilege. In such a case his failure to explain the
source of his numbers income in 1938 could properly be the subject of
comment and inference .... But where the claim of privilege is asserted
and unqualifiedly granted, the requirements of a fair trial may preclude
any comment. That certainly is true where the claim of privilege could
not properly be denied." The dilemma in which the petitioner found
himself is well stated by the Supreme Court. "The ruling of the court
gave the petitioner the choice between testifying and refusing to testify
as to his 1938 income. An accused having the assurance of the court
that his claim of privilege would be granted might well be entrapped if
his assertion of the privilege could then be used against him. His real
choice might then be quite different from his apparent one. In this case
it would lie between protection against an indictment for 1938 and the
use of his claim of privilege as evidence that he did in fact receive the
income during the last two months of 1937. Elementary fairness requires
that an accused should not be misled on that score. If advised by the
court that his claim of privilege though granted would be employed
against him, he well might never claim it. If he receives assurance that
it will be granted if claimed, or if it is claimed and granted outright, he
has every right to expect that the ruling is made in good faith and that
the rule against comment will be observed."
Although the petitioner was entitled to judgment on principle, his
case and his rights were prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to make
objection and note exceptions to the conduct of the prosecutor and the
instructions of the court. Justice Douglas, stating the majority opinion,
said that this amounted to a waiver of the petitioner' rights. The Su-
preme Court refused to .find for the petitioner for the reason that the
grounds for appeal had not appeared in the motion for a new trial or
in the assignments of error. "The point now is a mere afterthought."
This shows graphically how basic legal procedure is, and though consti-
tutional rights are at stake proper procedure is fundamental if any jus-
tice is to be administered.
From the Court's statements it is apparent that this decision does not
overthrow established principles. In fact it establishes another principle,
namely, that an accused may take the stand to testify in his own be-
half and if the court unqualifiedly grants him his claim of constitutional
privilege the prosecutor is estopped from making reference thereto or
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from drawing inferences therefrom. And the jury is likewise so re-
stricted. It is clear that this rule is different from the rule enunciated in
the case of State v. Ober previously referred to. In that case, it may be
recalled, the court refused the accused his claim of privilege. In the
Johnson case, however, the court did unqualifiedly grant the claim of
privilege. In State v. Ober the prosecutor was permitted to make com-
ment and draw inferences from the refusal to testify, and the jury had
the right to draw inferences therefrom. The Supreme Court said in the
Johnson case that after the granting of the privilege comment and in-
ference by the prosecutor and jury is prohibited, otherwise the privilege
is undermined and rendered ineffective.
The principles enunciated in the Johnson case square with common
sense and decent, just, constitutional government.
Warren A. Deahl.
